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This paper explores the impact of the regional jet (RJ), an important new technological inno-
vation in the airline industry, on service patterns and service quality. The evidence shows that
RJs were used to provide service on a large number of new hub-and-spoke (HS) and point-to-
point (PP) routes. In addition, they replaced discontinued jet and turboprop service on many
HS routes, as well as supplementing continuing jet service on such routes. When replace-
ment or supplementation by RJs occurred, passengers beneﬁted from better service quality
via higher ﬂight frequencies. The paper’s theoretical analysis predicts that the frequency ad-
vantage of RJs over jets, a consequence of their small size, should have led to the emergence
of PP service in thin markets where such service was previously uneconomical. However, the
evidence contradicts this prediction, showing that markets attracting new PP service by RJs
had demographic characteristics similar to those of markets that already had jet PP service or
attracted it after 1996.Technological Innovation in the Airline Industry: The Impact
of Regional Jets
by
Jan K. Brueckner and Vivek Pai
1. Introduction
While the airline industry has experienced a number of signiﬁcant institutional innovations
over the years, including the adoption of hub-and-spoke networks and frequent ﬂier programs
and the use of yield management techniques, true technological innovations have been less fre-
quent. The most signiﬁcant such innovation over the last ﬁfty years was the emergence of the
jet passenger aircraft in the 1960s. More recently, the 1990s have witnessed another techno-
logical innovation that, while less dramatic than the jet revolution, is nevertheless signiﬁcant.
This innovation is the introduction of the regional jet aircraft, which was made possible by the
development of eﬃcient jet engines suitable for smaller planes.1
Regional jets (RJs) oﬀer a previously unavailable combination of attributes. They combine
a relatively small passenger capacity, usually 70 seats or less, with a relatively long range (1500
miles), a high cruising speed comparable to that of mainline jets (over 500 mph), and a level of
passenger comfort that almost equals that of mainline jets. Turboprop aircraft, while providing
a similar small capacity, have a shorter range (less than 1000 miles), lower cruising speed (350
mph), and provide less comfort, mainly because of higher noise levels. A disadvantage of both
aircraft types relative to mainline jets is a higher operating cost per seat mile.2
Because RJs are superior to turboprops on most dimensions, passengers prefer them, and
this preference is one explanation for the explosion of RJ service since the late 1990s. This
explosion can be seen in Table 1, which shows the number of domestic routes with RJ service
(possibly in combination with other types of service) for each year between 1990 and 2005. This
route count pertains only to four major airlines (American, Continental, Delta and Northwest)
for which RJ usage data are available over this period, as explained further below. As shown
in the table, RJ service gained a foothold over the early 1990s and grew dramatically after
11996. By 2005, RJ service by the four major airlines was observed on over 1000 routes.3
While RJs have been widely used to replace turboprops as hub feeders from smaller end-
points, their attributes admit other uses as well. Since RJs oﬀer jet-like features but with
smaller capacities, they can be used to boost ﬂight frequencies on routes that would normally
be served by jets, either by supplementing or replacing jet service. The small size of RJs allows
ﬂight frequencies to be raised without the penalty of empty seats, which would be incurred if
additional mainline jets were used to boost frequency on a route.
This frequency advantage of RJs may also lead to the provision of service that was previ-
ously uneconomical. To understand this prediction, focus on a city-pair market involving small
or medium-size endpoints that are relativelyfar apart, and consider whether point-to-point ser-
vice (involving a direct ﬂight) is viable in the market. On the one hand, use of turboprops
is ruled out by the long ﬂight distance. In addition, market’s small size means that adequate
ﬂight frequency cannot be sustained with mainline jet service. Filling a mainline jet would
only be possible if ﬂight frequency were so low as to make the service non-viable (e.g., once
a day or less). With point-to-point service thus uneconomical, the only option is to serve the
market with connecting ﬂights through a hub airport.
RJs change this picture by oﬀering suﬃcient range to serve the market and a small enough
capacity to allow a viable level of ﬂight frequency. Thus, the introduction of RJs could allow
point-to-point service in a relatively thin city-pair market like the one in question. Note that,
when it occurs, such service bypasses hubs and thus tends to undermine existing hub-and-spoke
networks.
The purpose of this paper is to document and analyze the patterns of service for RJs after
1996, when their usage surged. Using the Department of Transportation’s T-100 database,
the paper explores the growth in RJ service on both hub-and-spoke and point-to-point routes.
The analysis focuses separately on routes that had no airline service at the start of the pe-
riod, gaining service after 1996, and on routes where RJs replaced or supplemented existing
service. The paper also attempts to evaluate the “new-routes” hypothesis described above,
which predicts new point-to-point RJ service on routes that could not be served economically
by jets.
2The existing economics literature on RJs and regional airlines is extremely sparse. Dresner
et al. (2002) analyze Continental’s regional jet usage to determine whether RJs supplement
jets or replace turboprops, and they also attempt to assess whether the availability of RJs
aﬀects the demand for air travel. The authors ﬁnd that RJs are mainly used on new hub-
and-spoke routes and that they appear to increase demand on routes where turboprops are
replaced. General Accounting Oﬃce (2001) provides related additional information on RJ
usage. Forbes and Lederman (2005) do not focus on RJs directly but instead study patterns of
vertical integration between regional feeders and the major airlines. The authors show that the
major airlines are likely to rely on trusted regional subsidiaries, rather than on independent
regional carriers, on those routes where schedule disruptions are costly to the major carrier
and likely to occur (on hub routes and routes prone to bad weather).
The plan of this paper is as follows. The main empirical ﬁndings are presented in section 4,
following a discussion of the data in section 3. To motivate the new-routes hypothesis, section
2 presents a simple theoretical model that shows how the introduction of an aircraft with
small seat capacity can generate point-to-point service in a market where it was previously
unavailable. For readers who have grasped the new-routes hypothesis but are uninterested in




The purpose of the model is to illustrate the new-routes hypothesis by showing how the
emergence of small jets can lead to new point-to-point (PP) service in a city-pair market
that previously enjoyed only connecting service via a hub. In the model, only one group
of passengers, those with a high valuation of ﬂight frequency, switches to PP service. The
remaining low-valuation passengers continue to make connecting trips.
In the model, an airline can charge higher fares as its ﬂight frequency rises, following the
analysis of Brueckner (2004). The reason is that higher frequency reduces “schedule delay”
for the passenger, allowing travel to occur closer to the preferred departure time. Assuming
3that the airline is a perfectly discriminating monopolist, able to extract all surplus from the
consumer, its fare p is then given by the relationship p = y − γ/f,w h e r ey is a constant, f
the number of ﬂights, and γ is a parameter related to the disutility of schedule delay. Note
that an increase in f, by reducing schedule delay, allows the airline to raise p.4
To address the question at hand, this setup is expanded to admit two types of consumers,
A and B, who are diﬀerentiated by their schedule delay costs, denoted γA and γB (they also
have diﬀerent y’s, yA and yB). The A-types represent business travelers, who have a strong
aversion to schedule delay, implying γA >γ B. Their population share is δ,w i t h1− δ giving
the B-types’ share.
The analysis also distinguishes between two types of routings, as seen in Figure 1. The city-
pair market of interest is XZ, which can be served in point-to-point fashion or via connecting
service through hub H. Connecting service, however, involves extra travel time, which imposes
utility costs of αA and αB on the two types of passengers.
Given these elaborations, the perfectly-discriminating monopolist will charge four diﬀerent
fares to XZ passengers, depending on their type and routing. Letting d and c superscripts
denote direct (point-to-point) and connecting service, these fares are given by
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B = yB − αB −
γB
fc , (4)
where fd and fc are the ﬂight frequencies for the two routings. Note that because γA >γ B,
type-A fares respond more than type-B fares to an increase in ﬂight frequency. Observe
also that, since fares extract all surplus, each passenger type is indiﬀerent between direct
and connecting travel. The monopolist can then divide the passengers between direct and
connecting service so as to maximize proﬁt, as seen below. The total number of XZ passenger
of both types is normalized to unity, with the total comprised of δ A-types and 1−δ B-types.
4For completeness, the analysis also considers “local” passengers in city-pair markets XH
and ZH, who make only direct trips. The two local markets are assumed to be large in size
relative to XZ, with N>1 passengers traveling in each market. Both A and B-types are
represented among these passengers, and the fares paid are equal to (2) and (4) with αA and
αB deleted. The reason is that local passengers experience the same ﬂight frequency (fc)a s
connecting passengers, but do not incur their longer trip time. The average fare paid by local
passengers is therefore
 p =  y −
 γ
fc (5)
where  y = δyA +( 1− δ)yB and  γ = δγA +( 1− δ)γB are the average y and γ values.
To derive the ﬂight frequencies fd and fc, aircraft are assumed for simplicity to operate
with no empty seats (with a 100% load factor). Letting s denote aircraft seating capacity and
q denote total passengers on a route, f then satisﬁes the relationship fs = q,w h i c hs a y st h a t
number of ﬂights times seats per ﬂight equals total passengers (so that f = q/s).
A key feature of the analysis is that s may diﬀer on the three routes shown in Figure 1,
contributing to a diﬀerence in ﬂight frequencies. For the hub routes XH and ZH, s assumes
the value sc, representing a large aircraft that is appropriate for serving these dense routes.
Assuming that route XZ is too long to be served by turboprop aircraft, the airline’s only
option in the pre-RJ era would have been to use aircraft of size sc on the route. However, the
emergence of RJs would allow s t ob es e ta tas m a l l e rv a l u esd <s c, more appropriate for the
potentially low traﬃc level on this route.
The traﬃc levels (q) on the three routes are also needed to compute ﬂight frequencies, and
these levels are aﬀected by the division of XZ passengers between direct and connecting service.
This division is ultimately chosen by the airline to maximize proﬁt. Let θA denote the share of
type-A passengers in the XZ market who travel direct, with 1−θA giving the share who make
a connecting trip. Let θB be deﬁned analogously for type-B passengers. Then, recalling that
market XZ has δ type-A and 1 − δ type-B passengers, traﬃc on the direct XZ route equals
qd = δθA +( 1 − δ)θB. (6)
5Correspondingly, traﬃc on each of the XH and ZH routes is given by
qc = N +1− qd. (7)
In this expression, N gives the number of local passengers, and 1 − qd gives the number of
connecting XZ passengers.
Combining the above information, ﬂight frequencies can be derived and total revenue for
the monopoly airline can be computed. Substituting 1/fc = sc/qc and 1/fd = sd/qd into the
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(1 − δ)(1 − θB). (8)
Note that the 2 factor in the ﬁrst line of (8) arises because there are two local markets.
The airline’s costs are computed by multiplying cost per seat times traﬃc on each of the
three routes it operates. Cost per seat is τc f o ra i r c r a f to fs i z esc on the connecting routes
and τd is the cost per seat for aircraft of size sd on the direct route. Since large aircraft have
lower cost per seat over a given distance, sc >s d would imply τc <τ d, provided all the route
segments are of equal length, as in Figure 1.5 Applying these seat costs to traﬃc on the three
routes, airline costs are then equal to
2τcqc + τdqd. (9)
2b. Choice of θA and θB
The airline’s goal is to maximize proﬁt π, equal to (8) minus (9), and its only choice
variables are θA and θB, which determine the division of type-A and type-B traﬃc between
6direct and connecting service. Note that θA and θB appear directly in (8) but that both qd
and qc in (8) and (9) also depend on the θ’s via (6) and (7). Through these latter impacts, θA
and θB aﬀect ﬂight frequencies (via the ratio terms in (8)) and thus the fares that the airline
is able to charge. For example, when θA increases, qd rises and qc falls, raising (lowering) ﬂight
frequencies and fares on the direct (connecting) routes. The eﬀects of these fare changes are
ampliﬁed by changes in type-A traﬃc on the two routes.
Making all these inﬂuences of θA and θB explicit, proﬁt can be written as π(θA,θ B). Some
tedious analysis (available on request) establishes two useful facts about this proﬁt function.
First, π(θA,θ B) is a strictly concave function of θB, which means that the optimal θB could
lie anywhere in the interval [0,1], including the endpoints. Second, provided that γA is large
relative to γB, proﬁt is a strictly convex function of θA.6 Under this condition, the optimal
θA is a corner solution, equal to either 0 or 1, which indicates that either all or none of the
A-types travel direct.
Given these properties of π(θA,θ B), conditions for a particularly simple division of XZ
traﬃc between direct and connecting service are easily stated. Under this division, all of the
B-types use connecting service, while all of the A-types travel direct. In other words, the
equalities θB =0a n dθA =1b o t hh o l d . 7 For this outcome to be optimal, the following




π(1,0) − π(0,0) > 0. (11)
These conditions indicate that movement away from (θA,θ B)=( 1 ,0) toward a higher θB (eq.
(10)) or lower θA (eq. (11)) reduces proﬁt. While these conditions are necessary, they do not




when combined with (11), is suﬃcient to exclude this possibility. Together, (10)–(12) ensure
the optimality of (θA,θ B)=( 1 ,0).
7Additional computations (again available on request) show that (10) reduces to the follow-
ing condition:
Ω ≡ (1−δ)(αB +2 τc − τd)+
sdδ(1 − δ)(γA − γB)
δ2 +
sc(1 − δ)N(γB − 2 γ)
(N +1− δ)2 < 0. (13)
To understand the ﬁrst term in the Ω expression in (13), note that when θB increases (sending
more B-types on direct trips), the airline gains from not needing to oﬀer the redirected passen-
gers the connecting fare discount, αB. It also saves connecting seat costs of 2τc while incurring
direct seat costs of τd. To derive the ﬁrst ratio term in (13), recall from (8) that the lower fares
required as compensation for schedule delay reduce revenue, with the revenue loss for direct
passengers equal to (γBsd/qd)(1−δ)θB +(γAsd/qd)δθA. The ﬁrst term in this expression rises
with θB even though qd increases (a consequence of the larger numerator), which raises the
revenue loss. However, with the numerator unchanged, the second term falls. Since γA >γ B,
the latter eﬀect dominates, so that the overall revenue loss falls as θB rises. The ﬁrst ratio
term in (13) captures the resulting positive eﬀect on proﬁt (note that δ in the denominator
equals qd). This proﬁt gain is increasing in sd, the aircraft size on the direct route, a fact that
plays a key role below. The last term in (13) gives the eﬀect of θB on schedule-delay losses for
local and connecting passengers (N +1+δ in the denominator equals qc).8
Eq. (11), the second of the above conditions, reduces to
























= δ(αA +2 τc − τd) − γAsd +
δsc[(1 − δ)(γA − γB)+N(γA − 2 γ)]
(N +1 ) ( N +1− δ)
> 0. (14)
The ﬁrst term (14) is analogous to corresponding term (13), while the remaining terms in the
ﬁrst two lines of (14) capture the changes in the revenue loss from schedule delay, with the
second term pertaining to local passengers and the third term to connecting XZ passengers.
8Note that the shift of the A-types reduces traﬃc on the connecting routes from N +1t o
N +1−δ, which alters the inverse frequency ratios that appear in parentheses. The last term
gives the change in the schedule-delay loss for the shifted type-A passengers themselves. All
these terms collapse into the last expression in the third line of (14), which is positive, minus
γAsd.9 A key diﬀerence relative to (13) is the negative eﬀect of sd, indicating that the proﬁt
gain from shifting all the A-types to direct service is smaller the larger is the aircraft size on
the direct route. This outcome reﬂects the disadvantage of lower frequency, which raises the
revenue loss from schedule delay on that route.
In a similar fashion, the condition (12) reduces to
Λ=( 1 −δ)(αB +2 τc − τd) −
scδ(1 − δ)(γA − γB)
(N +1 ) 2 +
sc(1 − δ)N(γB − 2 γ)
(N +1 ) 2 < 0. (15)
2c. The emergence of point-to-point service
With this background, the question of whether the emergence of RJs leads to new point-
to-point service can be addressed. To start, consider an initial situation where only aircraft of
size sc (mainline jets) are available, so that sd = sc and τd = τc.10 In this situation, suppose
the model parameters make θA =0a n dθB = 0 optimal, so that no direct XZ service is oﬀered.
Using the previous logic, optimality of this outcome is ensured when (10) and (12) hold along
with the reverse of the inequality in (11), so that the expressions in (13)–(15) are all negative
when sd = sc and τd = τc.11
Now suppose that RJs are introduced, allowing the XZ route to be served by aircraft
with sd <s c and τd >τ c. The ﬁrst observation is that, if the expressions in (10) and (12)
are initially negative, they remain negative after sd and τd assume their new values. This
conclusion follows because the Ω and Λ expressions in (13) and (15) are decreasing in τd and
increasing (or constant) in sd. Therefore, if connecting travel for the B-types (θB =0 )w a s
desirable in the absence of RJs, it remains so following their introduction.
The second and more-important observation is that a lower sd and higher τd may lead to
an increase in the value of Φ in (14). Although the net eﬀect is ambiguous in general since sd
and τd both appear in Φ with negative coeﬃcients, this outcome may emerge if the decline in
9sd is large relative to the increase in τd. Given that cost per seat in RJs is not dramatically
higher than the cost in mainline jets despite their much smaller size, this condition is realistic.
In the limiting case, where seat costs are independent of aircraft size, RJs would allow higher
frequency with no increase in cost, and their introduction would unambiguously raise the
magnitude of Φ.
The crucial conclusion is that such an increase can reverse the sign of Φ, making it positive
as in (14), so that θA = 1 becomes optimal. Thus, the introduction of RJs can lead to the
emergence of direct, point-to-point service in market XZ, which is used only by the type-A
passengers. The intuitive reason is that, by allowing higher ﬂight frequency on direct trips, the
availability of a smaller aircraft can tip the balance in the favor of such trips for the passengers
most sensitive to schedule delay. This conclusion yields the “new-routes hypothesis,” which
asserts that RJs allow the provision of new point-to-point service that was not economical
when only larger aircraft were available.
The remainder of the paper provides empirical evidence on the patterns of RJ usage. The
goal is both to document the impact of this important technological innovation and to test the
new-routes hypothesis.
3. Data
Data for the analysis of airline service patterns were drawn from the Department of Trans-
portation’s T-100 service-segment database. Derived from Form 41, which large certiﬁcated
carriers have submitted since 1990,12 the T-100 database contains aircraft types and numbers
of departures by carrier for each non-stop U.S. route segment, along with other information.
Beginning in the third quarter of 2002, reporting gaps were closed by the requirement that all
carriers, including regional and commuter air carriers, submit data.
Although RJ service began to grow dramatically starting in 1997, the reporting gaps that
existed before 2002 mean that much of this service (which was operated by non-reporting
regional carriers) is unobservable. Fortunately, however, regional carriers that operated as
subsidiaries of large certiﬁcated carriers submitted data sporadically over the ﬁrst half of
1990s and did so consistently starting in 1997. These carriers are American Eagle, a subsidiary
10of AMR (the parent of American Airlines), and Executive Airlines, a subsidiary of American
Eagle; ExpressJet, a former subsidiary of Continental Airlines; Atlantic Southeast and Comair,
subsidiaries of Delta Airlines; Pinnacle/Express Airlines, a subsidiary of Northwest Airlines,
and Mesaba Airlines, partially owned by Northwest. Business Express, an independent airline
that codeshared with Delta and Northwest prior to its absorbtion by American Eagle in 2000,
also reported data starting in 1997.
Given the availability of data for the period of interest, the analysis focuses solely on these
four major carriers (American, Continental, Delta and Northwest) and their associated regional
carriers, whose route segments were assigned to the major carrier. Hubs for the diﬀerent car-
riers over the 1996-2005 period, needed to determine hub-and-spoke (HS) and PP routes, are
as follows. American’s hubs are Dallas-Ft. Worth, Chicago-O’Hare, Miami, and St. Louis;
Continental’s hubs are Houston, Newark and Cleveland; Delta’s hubs are Atlanta, Cincinnati,
Dallas-Ft. Worth, New York-JFK, and Salt Lake City; Northwest’s hubs are Detroit, Min-
neapolis and Memphis. Three of these hub designations deserve note. American’s St. Louis
hub did not start operating until 2001, after the acquistion of TWA, and it was reduced in size
in 2003; Delta’s DFW hub was closed in 2004; and Delta’s JFK hub was not oﬃcially identiﬁed
by the airline until 2005. Since switching a route’s identify between PP and HS within the
period under study creates complications, the fact that each of these airports did not have
oﬃcial hub status throughout the period is ignored, leading to some potential misclassiﬁcation
of routes. However, this problem is very minor for St. Louis, and the treatment of JFK as a
Delta hub prior to 2005 may be appropriate in any case.13
The routes of Business Express, which provided service for both Delta and Northwest, were
allocated using hub identities. Servicewith an endpoint at the Delta hubs in Atlanta, Salt Lake
City, Dallas-Fort Worth, Cincinnati, and New York-JFK was assigned to Delta, while service
with an endpoint at the Northwest hubs in Detroit, Minneapolis, and Memphis was assigned
to Northwest. In addition, since Delta has signiﬁcant operations at New York-LaGuardia and
Boston, Business Express ﬂights in and out of these airports were assigned to Delta as well.
Demographic data for route endpoints is drawn from the Census. The conventions used to
assign census data to individual airports are described in the appendix.
114. Empirical Findings
4a. Basic patterns of new service
To begin appraising the impact of RJs on airline service patterns, the ﬁrst step is to
consider all the new domestic service, regardless of aircraft type, that was introduced after
1996.14 The role of RJs can then be seen in proper context. In portraying the patterns of new
service, the data from the four diﬀerent airlines were pooled, so that the identities of particular
carriers are suppressed. This approach is followed because the task of digesting four diﬀerent
service patterns for the individual carriers would be demanding and not very illuminating. In
addition, service on a route was counted only if it involves at least 20 ﬂights per month in each
direction.
New service patterns for HS routes and PP routes are considered separately, and the results
are shown in Table 2. The results pertain to routes that lacked any kind of service in 1996, and
where new service of some type was introduced over the period 1997–2005. Service patterns
seen on fewer than 10 routes are not reported. To interpret the service-type entries in the
table, the “Jet, RJ” row in the HS panel pertains to HS routes where both mainline jet and RJ
service were started (possibly at diﬀerent times) during the 1997–2005 period and maintained
during the period, and where no new turboprop service was started. Similarly, the “Jet” row
pertains to HS routes where (mainline) jet service was started and maintained and no other
type of service was introduced. The “RJ Intermittent” row pertains to HS routes where RJ
service was started and stopped (and possibly restarted) during the period, and where no other
type of service was present. The other entries have analogous interpretations. A handful of
the PP routes are duplicates, served by diﬀerent carriers.
Turning to the numerical information, the HS panel of the table shows that new service
was started on 704 HS routes over the 1997–2005 period. On 244 of these routes, RJ service
was started and maintained, with no other type of service provided. In the next most frequent
case, intermittent jet service was started on 62 routes, while continuing jet service was started
on 53 routes. Intermittent RJ service was started on 61 routes, while a mixture of intermittent
jet and continuing RJ service was started on 46 routes. Mixed continuing jet and RJ service
was started on 31 routes, and mixed continuing RJ and turboprop service was started on 24
12routes. The striking feature of these numbers is the dominance of the RJ service pattern,
where new service by RJs is started and maintained, with no other type of service present.
Thus, RJs played a key role over the period in expanding the linkages between hub airports
and endpoint cities across the country.
The PP panel shows that new PP service was started on 434 routes over the period. As in
the HS case, the most common new service type is RJ service that is started and maintained,
with no other service type present. Such service is observed on 91 routes. Intermittent jet
service, started on 89 routes, is the next most common case, with intermittent turboprop
service, started on 72 routes, close behind. In addition, 44 PP routes gained continuing jet
service, with no other service type present. The message of the PP panel is thus similar to
that of the HS results, although not as dramatic: an important source of new PP service is RJ
service that is started and maintained, with no other type of service present.
The bottom of Table 2 shows the breakdowns of the new HS and PP routes across the four
airlines. One notable feature of these breakdowns is Continental’s relatively small share in the
total, especially in the PP case.
4b. Service breakdowns by distance, population and income
The theoretical analysis in section 2 suggested that RJ’s may allow PP service in markets
where such service was not economical previously. To begin the task of appraising this new-
routes hypothesis, it is useful to compare the distributions of new RJ and jet service according
to market characteristics. Three characteristics of interest are: (i) the distance between the
endpoints; (ii) market size, as measured by average of the endpoint populations; and (iii)
market income, as measured by the average of the endpoint shares of high-income households
(those with incomes above $75,000). Although PP service is a principal focus, the service
breakdowns across these categories are shown for both HS and PP routes.
In comparing the distributions of new jet and RJ service, subsets of the cases shown in
Table 2 are considered. For jet service, only routes with continuing or intermittent jet service
and no other service type are considered, and for RJ service, only routes with continuing or
intermittent RJ service and no other service type are considered. The bottom panel of Table
3 shows the breakdowns by carrier for the resulting routes, revealing once again Continental’s
13small share.
The upper panel of Table 3 shows the service breakdowns over four distance categories:
less than 400 miles, 400 to 800 miles, 800 to 1200 miles, and more than 1200 miles. For
both the HS and PP cases, the table shows that jet service is skewed toward the long distance
categories, while RJ service is skewed toward the short distance categories. This ﬁnding, which
is also reﬂected in the mean distances shown in the table, is not surprising given that RJs have
a shorter range than mainline jets. However, a contributing factor may be the RJ’s slight
comfort disadvantage relative to mainline jets, which may help to limit RJ use on especially
long routes.
Table 4 shows the service breakdowns over four market size categories: average endpoint
population less than 1 million, between 1 and 2 million, between 2 and 6 million, greater than
6 million. The HS table shows noteworthy diﬀerences in the cell percentages in the largest
and smallest population categories, with jet service dominating in the largest markets and
RJ service dominating in smallest markets. The cell percentages in two middle categories are
closer together but reﬂect the same skewness pattern. Thus, the new HS routes with the largest
endpoints tend to attract jet service, while routes with smaller endpoints tend to attract RJ
service. This pattern is also reﬂected in the mean average populations shown in the table.
By contrast, the pattern seen in the PP panel of Table 4 is less clear. In the three cells
with the largest populations, jet service is slightly relatively skewed toward routes with large
endpoints, but the smallest population cell contradicts this pattern. Indeed, the mean average
populations are similar for the two types of service. This pattern is surprising given that
one would expect endpoint populations on PP routes to play a bigger role in determining
aircraft size than the populations on HS routes, given that the hub city is not a destination
for connecting passengers.
Table 5 shows the service breakdowns over four income categories: an average endpoint
share of high-income households less than 23%, a share between 23% and 30%, a share between
30% and 36%, a share above 36%. In the HS case, RJ service is slightly relativelyskewed toward
low-income markets, while in the PP case, no clear pattern is apparent (both outcomes are
reﬂected in the mean values). Observe, however, that while few high-income routes have new
14HS service, such routes are well represented in the PP case.
Summing up, Tables 3–5 show that the markets gaining new jet point-to-point service
were demographically similar to markets gaining new point-to-point service by RJs. The
markets diﬀered only in route distance, with RJ service skewed toward shorter routes. This
conclusion appears to contradict the predictions of the theoretical analysis, which suggested
that relatively thin city-pair markets will be the ones to attract new RJ point-to-point service,
with jets serving larger markets. Since the data show that new jet and RJ service is occurring in
similar markets, the evidence thus appears not to support this new-routes hypothesis. In other
words, RJs appear not to have generated new PP service in markets where it was previously
uneconomical.
4c. Probit analysis
Despite this tentative conclusion, this section of the paper further explores the question of
whether RJs are serving new kinds of markets by adopting a methodology that goes beyond
the simple comparisons in Tables 3–5. The ﬁrst step is to identify those markets where PP jet
service was provided in the pre-RJ era, prior to 1997. To ﬁnd the market characteristics that
led to such service, a probit equation is estimated on the universe of all possible PP routes, with
the dependent variable equal to one for those routes where jet service was observed and zero
for routes lacking PP jet service. The explanatory variables include the distance, population
and income measures from above, along with other variables.
Next, the estimated equation is used to make out-of-sample predictions. In particular, the
results are used to compute the mean predicted probability of PP jet service for routes that
gained new service following the introduction of RJs. The key step, however, is to carry out
this computation separately for routes that actually gained jet service and routes that actually
gained RJ service. If RJs are indeed serving PP markets that could not be served economically
by jets, then the probability of jet PP service in the markets that actually gained RJ service
should be low.
The size of this probability is judged by comparing it to the predicted probability of jet PP
service for markets that did in fact gain jet service in the RJ era. If RJs are indeed serving new
kinds of PP markets, then the predicted probability of jet service should be lower for markets
15that gained RJ service than for markets that gained jet service.
To carry out this exercise, routes with PP jet service in 1994, 1995 or 1996 by any of
the four airlines were identiﬁed. Then, routes shorter than 175 miles were dropped on the
grounds that they may represent tag-end service or other anomalies, as were routes connecting
endpoints with an average population of less than 75,000.15 The resulting set of routes was
then collapsed to eliminate a handful of duplicate routes served by multiple airlines. The result
was a set of 157 PP routes served with jets by at least one of the four airlines in the 1994-1996
period.
The universe of possible routes was generated from a set of 305 airports in the contintental
US, excluding the smallest endpoints. Potential PP routes were all possible airport combina-
tions from this set with distances of at least 175 miles, a total of 42,001 routes. PP jet service
was observed on only 157 of these routes, and the probit equation is intended to identify market
characteristics that made such service likely.
The distance, population and income measures from above (denoted DIST, POP and
INC75), appear in the probit equation along with several additional explanatory variables.16
The ﬁrst is the dummy variable LEISURE, which indicates whether either endpoint of the
route is Las Vegas or Orlando, both popular leisure destinations. The second variable (HUB)
indicates whether either of the endpoints is a hub for any of the four airlines. Since PP routes
in the sample by construction cannot include a hub endpoint for the carrier providing the
service, routes with such endpoints are less likely to appear among those with PP service.
Note, however, that an airline could provide PP service to the hub of a diﬀerent carrier. The
ﬁnal explanatory variable (SERVBOTH) is a count of the number of carriers from among
the four that served both endpoints of the route. Clearly, a requirement for PP service is
the presence of at least one of the carriers at both endpoints. Interestingly, this condition is
satisﬁed for 54% of the 42,001 potential PP routes.17
The probit results are shown in Table 6, with and without the SERVBOTH variable.
The covariate means in the third column show that 18% of the observations with PP service
have a hub endpoint (capturing PP service to some other carrier’s hub), that 24% have either
Las Vegas or Orlando as an endpoint, and that the average number of carriers serving both
16endpoints is 3.6 (close to the maximum possible value of 4).18
The coeﬃcient estimates in the second column, where SERVBOTH is omitted, mostly
conform to expectations, with all coeﬃcients signiﬁcant. PP jet service in a market is more
likely when the average of the endpoint populations is high, when the average share of high-
income households is high, and when one endpoint is Las Vegas or Orlando. PP service is less
likely when an endpoint is a hub for one of the carriers. The distance variable is entered in
quadratic fashion, and although the coeﬃcient of the squared term (DIST2) is positive, the
distance eﬀect is negative over the relevant range given the dominance of the negative linear
coeﬃcient. Therefore, PP jet service is less likely on long routes, where the incentive to send
passengers through a hub is evidently greater.
When SERVBOTH is added as an explanatory variable, its coeﬃcient is positive and
signiﬁcant, as expected. However, INC75’s coeﬃcient becomes negative and insigniﬁcant in
the presence of SERVBOTH. Apparently, the positive association between these variables
(indicating that both endpoints of high-income routes tend to attract same-carrier service)
precludes a separate measurement of INC75’s eﬀect.
Knowing that the explanatory variables perform well in explaining PP jet service in the
pre-RJ era, attention can turn to the predicted probabilities discussed above, which are shown
in the last few rows of Table 6. The within-sample predicted probabilities are shown ﬁrst,
and they indicate that the average predicted probability for the PP observations is 0.108 for
the equation with SERVBOTH and 0.038 for the equation without this variable. While these
probabilities are not large, they are much greater than the average predicted probabilities for
observations without PP service, which equal 0.003 in both equations.
The out-of-sample predicted probabilities are shown in the next two rows. They are com-
puted using the PP jet and RJ routes shown in Tables 3–5, which have continuing or intermit-
tent service and no other type of service. Routes shorter than 175 miles are dropped, which
(slightly) reduces the number of jet routes to 128 and the number of RJ routes to 121.
The predicted probability of PP jet service on the routes that gained such service after 1996
is 0.095 in the ﬁrst equation and 0.036 in the second, values that are very close to the in-sample
probabilities. The last row of the table shows the predicted probability of PP jet service on
17the routes that gained RJ service after 1996, equal to 0.105 and 0.044. These values are very
similar to the probabilities in the previous row and to the in-sample predicted probabilities.
This similarity reinforces the tentative conclusion reached above, namely, that the intro-
duction of RJs did not appear to extend PP service to new types of markets, as predicted under
the new-routes hypothesis. In particular, the routes gaining PP service by RJs after 1996 were
not routes unlikely to have gained jet PP service had the RJ never been introduced. Instead,
their probability of gaining jet service was nearly the same as the probability for routes that
did gain jet service after 1996. Moreover, the routes that gained RJ service had about the
same probability of PP jet service as the routes that already enjoyed it prior to 1997.
This conclusion partly reﬂects the fact that the demographic characteristics of PP routes
gaining jet and RJ service are very similar. While this fact was seen in the population and
income comparisons in Tables 4 and 5, the deletion of routes shorter than 175 miles slightly
alters the relevant numbers. The resulting means of POP and INC75 for the routes gaining
jet service are 4.2 million and 26%, respectively, while the means of these variables for the
routes gaining RJ service are 4.1 million and 28%, values that closely match. Moreover, this
similarity extends as well to the demographics of the routes having pre-1997 jet PP service,
which have mean POP and INC75 values of 3.6 million and 26%, as seen in Table 6. These
values are close to the previous numbers, but they show that new PP service involves markets
that are slightly larger and richer than markets enjoying PP jet service prior to 1997.
One signiﬁcant disparity, noted above, is in the distance measures for the diﬀerent routes.
Table 6 shows that the average distance of the pre-1997 PP jet routes is 800 miles, while the
average distances for the new jet and RJ PP routes are 1205 and 590 miles, respectively.19
While these distance diﬀerences are substantial, they are not suﬃcient (when combined with
variation in the other explanatory variables) to generate large diﬀerences in the predicted
probabilities across the three types of routes. But their existence yields a simple conclusion
about how the emergence of RJs has aﬀected PP service. In particular, while PP service
following the introduction of RJs focused on markets with demographics broadly similar to
those of markets with pre-1997 PP jet service, long-distance markets within this group were
served by jets and short-distance markets by RJs. Thus, it appears that the introduction of
18RJs has mainly allowed a better tailoring of aircraft to market distance in PP service.
4.4. Patterns of replacement and supplementation
While the preceding analysis has focused on new service, RJs have been widely used to
replace and supplement existing service. The relevant replacement patterns are shown in Table
7. Of the 152 HS routes where jet service was discontinued after 1996, RJs replaced this service
on 109 routes. Of the 184 HS routes where turboprop service was discontinued after 1996, RJs
replaced this service on 105 routes. Replacement of jets by turboprops or turboprops by jets
was rare, and in addition, many routes where jet service was discontinued saw no replacements
at all. By contrast, on PP routes where jet or turboprop service was discontinued, replacement
was rare, and if itoccurred at all, RJs provided the service. Evidently,discontinuation of service
on a PP route signaled an unsuccessful market where replacement was not desirable.
Table 7 also shows the changes in ﬂight frequencies for those routes where replacement
involved RJs. As can be seen, on HS routes where RJs replaced jets, frequency rose, and on
all routes where RJs replaced turboprops, frequency fell.20 These changes are in line with
the change in aircraft size, in the sense that downsizing a route’s aircraft should allow higher
frequencies, while upsizing (as usually occurs when RJs replace turboprops) should reduce
frequencies. Thus, Table 7 clearly shows the frequency advantage of RJs over jets, as discussed
in the introduction. Note that while frequency dropped on the single PP route where RJs
replaced jets, this outcome appears to be an anomaly.
Like replacement, supplementation of jet service on PP routes was rare. Service supple-
mentation was common, however, on HS routes, as shown in Table 8. Of 603 HS routes with
jet service in 1996 that was not discontinued, RJs supplemented this service on 261 routes and
turboprops supplemented on 16 routes, leaving 326 routes without supplementation.21 On
routes where RJ supplementation occurred, frequency rose by 17.5%.
The ﬁgures in Tables 7 and 8 show that, while providing service on many routes not
previously served, RJs played two further important roles by replacing and supplementing
existing service on a large number of additional routes. When these outcomes occurred on
previous jet routes, ﬂight frequenciesrose, enhancing the service quality provided to passengers.
195. Conclusion
This paper has explored the impact of the regional jet, an important new technological
innovation in the airline industry, on service patterns and service quality. The evidence shows
that RJs were used to provide service on a large number of new hub-and-spoke and point-to-
point routes. In addition, they replaced discontinued jet and turboprop service on many HS
routes, as well as supplementing continuing jet service on such routes. When replacement or
supplementation by RJs occurred, passengers beneﬁted from better service quality via higher
ﬂight frequencies.
The paper’s theoretical analysis predicted that the frequency advantage of RJs over jets,
a consequence of their small size, should have led to the emergence of point-to-point service
in thin markets where such service was previously uneconomical. In these markets, use of
large aircraft would have required ﬂight frequencies so low as to make service nonviable, while
the RJ’s smaller size would support viable frequencies. However, the evidence contradicts
this “new-routes” hypothesis, showing that markets attracting new point-to-point service by
RJs had demographic characteristics similar to those of markets that already had jet point-
to-point service or attracted it after 1996. Therefore, the innovation associated with RJs did
not appear to lead to the emergence of new airline “products” (new route types). Instead,
the RJ helped the airlines to improve the quality of their existing products through more
attractive ﬂight frequencies, while allowing operational gains through a better tailoring of
aircraft characteristics to route distances.
Given the plausibility of the new-routes hypothesis, the failure to ﬁnd empirical support
for it is somewhat puzzling. One possible explanation for the lack of support relates to an
important institutional constraint that governs airline operations, known as the “scope clause.”
These union-contract provisions limit RJ operations by the regional subsidiaries of major
carriers, reﬂecting union fears that RJ growth will reduce employment levels for mainline
jet pilots. With RJ usage limited by scope clauses, the major carriers may have been unable
deploy RJs in their full range of potential uses. New point-to-point service may have been one
of the uses blocked by these constraints, explaining its absence in the data.22
While this view suggests that independent regional operators, which are not aﬀected by
20scope clauses, may be have been freer than the major airlines to initiate new point-to-point RJ
service, data on their operations are unavaiable for much of the sample period, as explained
above. However, the recently announced plans of ExpressJet, a regional carrier released by
Delta from a portion of its feeder duties, provide some anecdotal conﬁrmation of the new-
routes hypothesis. ExpressJet intends to use its surplus RJs to oﬀer point-to-point service
in a number of relatively thin city-pair markets, with San Diego-Omaha being one example.
Given this evidence, the new-routes hypothesis may be more relevant than the present results
indicate.
21Appendix
Airports were assigned to a metropolitan statistical area (MSA) based on the name of the
airport. Most airports identify themselves as serving a speciﬁc city, and therefore a matching
MSA, making the assignment of census data unambiguous. However, ambiguity arises in two
special cases: (i) where one airport serves multiple MSAs, and (ii) where multiple airports
serve a given MSA.
In case (i), the population-weighted average of INC75 for the relevant MSAs was computed.
Aﬀected airports were CAK, where the Akron, OH and Canton-Massillon, OH MSAs were
combined; ELM, where the Corning, NY and Elmira, NY MSAs were combined; MAF, where
the Midland, TX and Odessa, TX MSAs were combined; RDU, where the Raleigh and Durham,
NC MSAs were combined. For the Hartford-Springﬁeld International Airport, BDL, the airport
was assigned to the Hartford, CT, MSA due to the longer distance to Springﬁeld, MA.
In case (ii), the same MSA was assigned to each airport in the area, unless it was pos-
sible to assign a Metropolitan Division to the airport. For the Los Angeles MSA, LAX was
assigned to the Los Angeles Metropolitan Division and Orange County (SNA) to the Santa
Ana-Anaheim-Irvine Division. For the San Francisco Bay Area, San Francisco (SFO) was as-
signed to the San Francisco-San Mateo-Redwood City Division, and Oakland (OAK) to the
Oakland-Fremont-Hayward Division. San Jose (SJC) was assigned to the San Jose-Sunnyvale-
Santa Clara, CA MSA. In the Chicago area, O’Hare (ORD) and Midway (MDW) were assigned
to the Chicago MSA. For the New York City area, LaGuardia (LGA), John F. Kennedy (JFK),
and Newark (EWR) were assigned to the New York-North New Jersey-Long Island MSA. Is-
lip (ISP) and White Plains (HPN) were assigned to the Nassau-Suﬀolk and New York-White
Plains Metropolitan Divisions respectively.
Several airports do not fall into a MSA or could not be easily assigned to a Metropolitan
Division in a large MSA, and for these cases, census data were gathered for the city in which
airport is located. These airports are Traverse City, MI, Pasco, WA, Montrose, CO, Missoula,
MT, Melbourne, FL, Jackson, WY, Helena, MT, Gunnison, CO, Bozeman, MT, Vail, CO,
Kailspell, MT, Meridian, MS, Butte, MT, Hanover, NH Minot, ND, Harlingen, TX, Temple,
22TX, Cody, WY, Burbank, CA, Long Beach, CA, Palm Springs, CA, Aspen, CO, Durango,
C O ,H a y d e n ,C O ,K e yW e s t ,F L ,M a r a t h o n ,F L ,B r u n s w i c k ,G A ,B u r l i n g t o n ,I A ,P r e s q u eI s l e ,
ME, Nantucket, MA. Due to the lack of available data, Martha’s Vineyard and Hyannis, MA
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Patterns of New Service
HS routes PP routes
Service type routes share Service type routes share
Jet 53 .08 Jet 44 .10
RJ 244 .35 RJ 91 .21
Turbo 38 .05 Turbo 14 .03
Jet intermittent 62 .09 Jet intermittent 89 .21
RJ intermittent 61 .09 RJ intermittent 35 .08
Turbo intermittent 29 .04 Turbo intermittent 72 .17
Jet, RJ 31 .04 Jet intermittent, RJ 10 .02
RJ, Turbo 24 .03 RJ, Turbo both intermittent 20 .05
Jet, RJ both intermittent 20 .03
RJ, Turbo intermittent 17 .02
Jet intermittent, RJ 46 .06
Carrier routes share Carrier routes share
American 181 .26 American 157 .36
Continental 108 .15 Continental 21 .05
Delta 218 .31 Delta 140 .32
Northwest 197 .28 Northwest 116 .27
Total 704 Total 434
25Table 3
Distribution of New Jet and RJ Service by Distance
HS routes PP routes
Distance Jet Routes RJ Routes Distance Jet Routes RJ Routes
in miles (Column share) in miles (Column share)
< 400 5 31 < 400 20 34
(.04) (.10) (.15) (.27)
400 to 800 8 183 400 to 800 10 68
(.07) (.60) (.08) (.54)
800 to 1200 26 82 800 to 1200 60 21
(.23) (.27) (.45) (.17)
≥ 1200 76 9 ≥ 1200 43 3
(.66) (.03) (.32) (.02)
total routes 115 305 total routes 133 126
mean distance 1461 682 mean distance 1165 571
Carrier Jet Routes RJ Routes Carrier Jet Routes RJ Routes
American 40 78 American 52 41
Continental 22 56 Continental 9 11
Delta 33 116 Delta 44 56
Northwest 20 55 Northwest 28 18
26Table 4
Distribution of New Jet and RJ Service by Population
HS routes PP routes
Average of Jet Routes RJ Routes Average of Jet Routes RJ Routes
Endpoint Pops. (Column share) Endpoint Pops. (Column share)
< 1 million 4 31 < 1 million 16 8
(.03) (.10) (.12) (.06)
1 to 2 million 27 84 1 to 2 million 38 42
(.23) (.28) (.29) (.33)
2 to 6 million 62 155 2 to 6 million 35 42
(.54) (.51) (.26) (.33)
≥ 6 million 22 35 ≥ 6 million 44 35
(.19) (.11) (.33) (.28)
total routes 115 305 total routes 133 126
mean avg. pop. 3.9 m. 3.2 m. mean avg. pop. 4.1 m. 4.0 m.
27Table 5
Distribution of New Jet and RJ Service by Income
HS routes PP routes
Average of High Jet Routes RJ Routes Average of High Jet Routes RJ Routes
Income Shares (Column share) Income Shares (Column share)
< 23% 22 67 < 23% 34 35
(.19) (.22) (.26) (.28)
23% to 30% 51 191 23% to 30% 45 29
(.44) (.63) (.34) (.23)
30% to 36% 41 46 30% to 36% 42 41
(.36) (.15) (.32) (.33)
≥ 36% 1 1 ≥ 36% 12 21
(.01) (.00) (.09) (.17)
total routes 115 305 total routes 133 126
mean average share 28% 27% mean average share 28% 28%
28Table 6
Probit Results†
Covariate Coeﬃcients Covariate mean for
obs. with service
CONSTANT -3.436* -2.540* –
(0.208) (0.139)
DIST -0.155* -0.114* 800
(0.014) (0.011)
DIST2 0.004* 0.002* –
(0.000) (0.000)
POP 0.131* 0.157* 3,576,022
(0.016) (0.013)
INC75 -0.004 0.012* 25.8
(0.008) (0.006)
LEISURE 1.080* 1.200* 0.24
(0.108) (0.090)
HUB -0.652* -0.344* 0.18
(0.104) (0.095)
SERVBOTH 0.625* – 3.60
(0.044)
Routes Predicted Probabilities
Jet PP 1994-96 0.108 0.038
Jet PP Post-1996 0.095 0.036
RJ PP Post-1996 0.105 0.044
†Dependent variable equals 1 for routes with
1994-1996 jet PP service and 0 otherwise; asterisks
indicate coeﬃcients signiﬁcant at the 5%
level; observations = 42,001.
29Table 7
Replacement Patterns
HS routes PP routes
Outcome Routes where Jet Outcome Routes where Jet
Discontinued (152) Discontinued (102)
RJ replaces 109 RJ replaces 1
Turbo replaces 6 Turbo replaces 0
No replacement 37 No replacement 101
Avg. frequency change +66.4% Avg. frequency change −34.9%
with RJ replacement with RJ replacement
HS routes PP routes
Outcome Routes where Turbo Outcome Routes where Turbo
Discontinued (184) Discontinued (57)
RJ replaces 105 RJ replaces 5
Jet replaces 8 Jet replaces 0
No replacement 71 No replacement 52
Avg. frequency change −33.9% Avg. frequency change −32.9%
with RJ replacement with RJ replacement
30Table 8
HS Supplementation Patterns




Avg. frequency change +17.5%
with RJ supplementation
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32Footnotes
∗We thank Volodymyr Bilotkach, Ricardo Flores-Fillol, Darin Lee and Ken Small for com-
ments. Any shortcomings in the paper, however, are our responsibility.
1See Babikian et al. (2002).
2Again, see Babikian et al. (2002).
3Despite increased RJ usage, reports in the trade press document recent growth in the demand
for ATR and Bombardier turboprops. This development reﬂects both the general traﬃc
rebound in the airline industry and the fact that turboprops are more economical than RJs
on shorter routes.
4The details of this derivation are as follows. In Brueckner’s model, consumers must commit
to travel before knowing their preferred departure times, which are uniformly distributed
around a circle. Letting T denote the time circumference of the circle, consumer utility
then depends on expected schedule delay, which equals T/4f,w h e r ef is number of (evenly
spaced) ﬂights operated by the airline. This expression gives the expected diﬀerence between
the consumer’s preferred departure time and the nearest ﬂight time. Letting ν be a disutility
parameter, the cost of schedule delay is then νT/4f ≡ γ/f,w h e r eγ = νT/4. Utility for a
consumer is given by c+b−γ/f,w h e r eb is travel beneﬁt and c is consumption expenditure.
Since consumption expenditure equals income w minus the airfare p, utility can then be
written w − p + b − γ/f. Letting u denote the utility from the consumer’s outside option,
which might represent a diﬀerent travel mode or not traveling at all, surplus extraction by
the airline implies that w − p + b − γ/f = u,o rp = y − γ/f, where y ≡ w + b − u.
5If the direct route were longer than the individual connecting routes (if the triangle in Figure
1 were ﬂattened), this cost disadvantage would be ampliﬁed. This cost speciﬁcation can be
derived from the approach of Brueckner (2004), as follows. Brueckner assumes that cost per
ﬂight entails a ﬁxed cost µ and a variable cost per seat η, so that cost per ﬂight equals µ+ηs
and cost per seat is µ/s + η. With diﬀerent aircraft sizes in direct and connecting service,
costs per seat are then τd = µ/sd + η and τc = µ/sc + η<τ d.
6Speciﬁcally, convexity is ensured when γA > 2 γ,w h e r e γ from above is the value γ in the
population. Since γA >γ B and  γ is a weighted average of these variables, γA >  γ holds.
But the inequality γA > 2 γ is more stringent, and rearrangement shows that it requires the
inequalities δ<1/2a n dγA > [2(1 − δ)/(1 − 2δ)]γB to both be satisﬁed. For example, if
δ =1 /3, then the latter inequality reduces to γA > 4γB, indicating that the relatively scarce
A-types (business travellers) must be four times as averse to schedule delay as the B-types,
33a plausible restriction.
7Divisions of traﬃc where some or all of the B-types travel direct along with the A-types are
also possible, but the given division seems most natural and is thus the focus of the analysis.
8With a smaller qc leading to a lower connecting frequency, the revenue loss for local passen-
gers rises with θB, producing a negative impact on proﬁt captured by the term involving
−2 γ. This decline in proﬁt is oﬀset by a smaller revenue loss for connecting XZ passengers
when θB rises, but the net proﬁt impact remains negative given γB < 2 γ.
9Recall from footnote 7 that γA > 2 γ is assumed to hold.
10The assumption τd = τc presumes that the three routes in Figure 1 are of equal length. The
ensuing argument would be unaﬀected if τd  = τc.
11Each of these expressions contains both positive and negative terms, and the negative terms
must dominate for the given conditions to hold.
12The BTS deﬁnes large certiﬁcated air carriers as airlines that hold Certiﬁcates of Public
Convenience and Necessity issued by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) and
operate aircraft with seating capacity of more than 60 seats or a maximum payload capacity
of more than 18,000 pounds.
13In the case of STL, the only American service in the years 1996–1999 was from the hubs ORD
and DFW (making the HS designation of STL routes correct for these years), while one PP
route appeared in 2000 and four more in 2001, which are then misclassiﬁed as HS routes (a
large number of STL HS routes emerge in 2002 after American’s takeover of the TWA hub).
Since this approach understates the count of PP routes, which are of special interest, it is
conservative and thus defensible. In the case of JFK, the number of Delta routes with this
endpoint was in the low twenties over the 1996-2003 period, increasing to 31 in 2004 and 36
in 2005. This information suggests that viewing JFK as a Delta hub over the entire sample
period is appropriate, even though it does not gain this status oﬃcially until 2005.
14Because of their atypical nature, routes to Hawaii are not considered.
15Tag-end service occurs in remote parts of the country where hub-bound ﬂights from a small
city may make an intermediate stop at another small airport to collect passengers, giving a
false impression of PP service. Routes where the average of the endpoint populations was
less than 75,000 were also dropped.
3416In the probit estimation, DIST is measured in hundreds of miles and POP is measured in
millions.
17An additional covariate measured the average white-collar employment share in the endpoint
cities, but this variable performed poorly.
18The means of HUB, LEISURE and SERVBOTH for the routes gaining jet service are 0.17,
0.26 and 3.77, respectively, while the means of these variables for the routes gaining RJ
service are 0.19, 0.13, and 3.34.
19Because of the elimination of PP routes shorter than 175 miles, these means are slightly
larger than those in Table 2.
20The frequency change is computed from 1997 to 2005, and it is based on average frequency
during the years with only jet service and average frequency during subsequent years when
only RJ service was present.
21Supplementation by both RJs and turboprops occurred on 12 routes.
22We thank Darin Lee for this explanation.
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